Russia cannot support the dictatorial regime in Belarus any more.
Andrei Sannikov, the leader of the civil campaign European Belarus, said it in an interview with Rzeczpospolita (Poland).
– Aliaksandr Lukashenko will soon mark the 20th anniversary of his rule in Belarus. None dictators in Europe managed to hold the power that long. How is he doing this?
This is the result of a series of accidents: failures of the Belarusian opposition and the stance of the United States, the European Union and Poland. We didn't realize the threat of Lukashenko in the beginning. In 1994, people voted more against the reviving communist nomenclature that led the country to stagnation rather than for him. He was a populist, but he represented a kind of an alternative. The first dangerous signal was one year later, when an illegal referendum to change the state flag and coat of arms was held. The Russian language was then set as the second state language, and the president receives additional powers. We, the opposition, missed this moment. We were thinking: The changes are temporary because the election will be held soon; Lukashenka will lose the election and we will cancel the changes. But it wasn't a fair election. Charismatic opposition leaders that could have won easily – Henadz Karpenka, Yury Zakharanka and Viktar Hanchar – were killed.
– What is the blame of the European Union and the US?
The EU reacted to the suppression of democracy by freezing relations with Belarus. It was a half-measure. Brussels failed to propose a united policy and returned to the illusion that Lukashenka would change. The scheme of the alternate freezing and improving relations was created. It was later repeated several times, when Lukashenka tightened screws in 2000 and 2010. Most European capitals had been looking at Belarus through Moscow's prism for many years. I mean in particular Gerhard Schröder and the German Social Democrats first of all. It was a great mistake, because Europe could have influenced the development of democracy in Belarus more efficiently than in Russia and Ukraine because our country is far less. At the same time, our strategic location allows us to influence the evolution in Russia and Ukraine. Nothing strange that these countries are moving to Lukashenko's authoritarian model today. Speaking about America, Barack Obama is little interested in our region.
– Why are you so sure that the EU's firm policy towards Lukashenka can help the opposition?
Let me give you two examples. When Europe reacted to crimes of the regime in 1999, killings of activists were stopped. In 2011, Zmitser Bandarenka and I were released from jail due to the EU's stance. When Europe's position softened, some opposition members, such as Mikalai Statkevich, remained in prison.
– Did Poland made the same mistake as the EU did?
Poland can play the same role for Belarus that Ronald Reagan played for Poland in the 1980s. Nevertheless, Warsaw failed to propose a consistent strategy on its eastern neighbour. It was clear until 2004: All country's efforts were focused on the integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. But later, Poland should have taken more decisive steps to help the elimination of the dictatorship on its eastern border. Only the problem of the Polish ethnic minority [in Belarus] was able to involve the Polish MFA into Belarusian issue. Later we saw a reaction to the elimination of opposition by Lukashenko in 2010. But these were single actions without a clear strategy. Unfortunately, they have already ended.
– Radoslaw Sikorski made a rather risky attempt to meet Lukashenka halfway in exchange for liberalisation of the dictatorship. This concept failed, but it was a kind of a strategy.
It wasn't the idea of Radoslaw Sikorski. It was a tendency of the EU. Belarusian opposition warned about it. We warned that Lukashenka would use the “thaw” to further strengthen the dictatorship and the total control system. The Belarusian police have more than 150,000 personnel. Proportionally, this is more than in Russia. Lukashenka boasts that 12,000 people work for the KGB. He learns the experience of the Orange Revolution and the Arab Spring. For example, the control over the media in Belarus is stricter than that in Egypt and Tunisia. There are no mass rallies that wouldn't be controlled by planted secret agents.
– The concept of negotiations with Lukashenka on democratic changes wasn't perhaps so naïve: This model led to the collapse of the communist dictatorship in Poland and other countries of the Eastern Bloc.
- There is a significant difference between today's Belarus and Poland 25 years ago: Lukashenka is not a Belarusian dictator. He is a dictator in Belarus. He doesn't feel any ties with people. He doesn't care about their interests. He is obsessed with power. That's the reason why he and democratic opposition have no meeting points that could be a basis for an agreement. Jaruzelski was a different matter: not the USSR or the Eastern Bloc, but Poland was the centre of the world for him.
– Wouldn't it be so that the EU's firm policy towards Lukashenka will push Belarus to Russia?
This argument, invented by the KGB in Minsk, was successfully spread in Europe through embassies in Belarus. Russia's real interests hardly lie in the takeover of Belarus and strengthening its image of a country conducting an aggressive foreign policy. Even the Soviet Union had to accept the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia under international pressure in the late 1980, thought they were harder times than we have today. Vladimir Putin will have to modernise Russia. He cannot afford spending 10 billion dollar per year to support Lukashenka's regime without any profit. The EU's attempts to improve relations with Minsk, that we are observing again, are profitable for the Kremlin: They make the dictator ask for less Russian money. Lukashenko uses aid from Brussels against us, the opposition.
– The Belarusian opposition is not innocent too. Why didn't you unite around a single candidate, like Solidarity around Lech Walesa?
I supported the single opposition candidate at the elections in 2001 and 2006, but it turned out that they were strictly controlled by the regime. All our plans leaked to the KGB and got disrupted. The situation was different in 2010: nine candidates ran against Lukashenka, some of them were appointed by the regime, but the others not. It mobilised people and gave them hopes for changes that people still have in spite of the repression.
Another reason for difficulties in uniting opposition in Belarus is that, unlike Ukraine and Georgia, we don't have oligarchs who don't depend on the authorities and can support alternative politicians. Lukashenka reacts immediately to any contacts with the opposition.
– Does Belarus have any chances of joining the EU one day?
It certainly has. If democratic changes start, it will happen sooner than one can imagine. Support of Lukashenko is falling drastically, because the crisis of 2010-2011 showed that he is no longer able to offer necessary living conditions to people.
