Monday, July 22, 2013

Andrey Sannikov: Moscow Wants Europeans to Finance Dictator Lukashenko Too


Andrei Sannikov: Moscow wants Europeans to finance Lukashenka too

Russia cannot support the dictatorial regime in Belarus any more.

Andrei Sannikov, the leader of the civil campaign European Belarus, said it in an interview with Rzeczpospolita (Poland).

– Aliaksandr Lukashenko will soon mark the 20th anniversary of his rule in Belarus. None dictators in Europe managed to hold the power that long. How is he doing this?

This is the result of a series of accidents: failures of the Belarusian opposition and the stance of the United States, the European Union and Poland. We didn't realize the threat of Lukashenko in the beginning. In 1994, people voted more against the reviving communist nomenclature that led the country to stagnation rather than for him. He was a populist, but he represented a kind of an alternative. The first dangerous signal was one year later, when an illegal referendum to change the state flag and coat of arms was held. The Russian language was then set as the second state language, and the president receives additional powers. We, the opposition, missed this moment. We were thinking: The changes are temporary because the election will be held soon; Lukashenka will lose the election and we will cancel the changes. But it wasn't a fair election. Charismatic opposition leaders that could have won easily – Henadz Karpenka, Yury Zakharanka and Viktar Hanchar – were killed.

– What is the blame of the European Union and the US?

The EU reacted to the suppression of democracy by freezing relations with Belarus. It was a half-measure. Brussels failed to propose a united policy and returned to the illusion that Lukashenka would change. The scheme of the alternate freezing and improving relations was created. It was later repeated several times, when Lukashenka tightened screws in 2000 and 2010. Most European capitals had been looking at Belarus through Moscow's prism for many years. I mean in particular Gerhard Schröder and the German Social Democrats first of all. It was a great mistake, because Europe could have influenced the development of democracy in Belarus more efficiently than in Russia and Ukraine because our country is far less. At the same time, our strategic location allows us to influence the evolution in Russia and Ukraine. Nothing strange that these countries are moving to Lukashenko's authoritarian model today. Speaking about America, Barack Obama is little interested in our region.

– Why are you so sure that the EU's firm policy towards Lukashenka can help the opposition?

Let me give you two examples. When Europe reacted to crimes of the regime in 1999, killings of activists were stopped. In 2011, Zmitser Bandarenka and I were released from jail due to the EU's stance. When Europe's position softened, some opposition members, such as Mikalai Statkevich, remained in prison.

– Did Poland made the same mistake as the EU did?

Poland can play the same role for Belarus that Ronald Reagan played for Poland in the 1980s. Nevertheless, Warsaw failed to propose a consistent strategy on its eastern neighbour. It was clear until 2004: All country's efforts were focused on the integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. But later, Poland should have taken more decisive steps to help the elimination of the dictatorship on its eastern border. Only the problem of the Polish ethnic minority [in Belarus] was able to involve the Polish MFA into Belarusian issue. Later we saw a reaction to the elimination of opposition by Lukashenko in 2010. But these were single actions without a clear strategy. Unfortunately, they have already ended.

– Radoslaw Sikorski made a rather risky attempt to meet Lukashenka halfway in exchange for liberalisation of the dictatorship. This concept failed, but it was a kind of a strategy.

It wasn't the idea of Radoslaw Sikorski. It was a tendency of the EU. Belarusian opposition warned about it. We warned that Lukashenka would use the “thaw” to further strengthen the dictatorship and the total control system. The Belarusian police have more than 150,000 personnel. Proportionally, this is more than in Russia. Lukashenka boasts that 12,000 people work for the KGB. He learns the experience of the Orange Revolution and the Arab Spring. For example, the control over the media in Belarus is stricter than that in Egypt and Tunisia. There are no mass rallies that wouldn't be controlled by planted secret agents.

– The concept of negotiations with Lukashenka on democratic changes wasn't perhaps so naïve: This model led to the collapse of the communist dictatorship in Poland and other countries of the Eastern Bloc.

- There is a significant difference between today's Belarus and Poland 25 years ago: Lukashenka is not a Belarusian dictator. He is a dictator in Belarus. He doesn't feel any ties with people. He doesn't care about their interests. He is obsessed with power. That's the reason why he and democratic opposition have no meeting points that could be a basis for an agreement. Jaruzelski was a different matter: not the USSR or the Eastern Bloc, but Poland was the centre of the world for him.

– Wouldn't it be so that the EU's firm policy towards Lukashenka will push Belarus to Russia?

This argument, invented by the KGB in Minsk, was successfully spread in Europe through embassies in Belarus. Russia's real interests hardly lie in the takeover of Belarus and strengthening its image of a country conducting an aggressive foreign policy. Even the Soviet Union had to accept the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia under international pressure in the late 1980, thought they were harder times than we have today. Vladimir Putin will have to modernise Russia. He cannot afford spending 10 billion dollar per year to support Lukashenka's regime without any profit. The EU's attempts to improve relations with Minsk, that we are observing again, are profitable for the Kremlin: They make the dictator ask for less Russian money. Lukashenko uses aid from Brussels against us, the opposition.

– The Belarusian opposition is not innocent too. Why didn't you unite around a single candidate, like Solidarity around Lech Walesa?

I supported the single opposition candidate at the elections in 2001 and 2006, but it turned out that they were strictly controlled by the regime. All our plans leaked to the KGB and got disrupted. The situation was different in 2010: nine candidates ran against Lukashenka, some of them were appointed by the regime, but the others not. It mobilised people and gave them hopes for changes that people still have in spite of the repression.
Another reason for difficulties in uniting opposition in Belarus is that, unlike Ukraine and Georgia, we don't have oligarchs who don't depend on the authorities and can support alternative politicians. Lukashenka reacts immediately to any contacts with the opposition.

– Does Belarus have any chances of joining the EU one day?

It certainly has. If democratic changes start, it will happen sooner than one can imagine. Support of Lukashenko is falling drastically, because the crisis of 2010-2011 showed that he is no longer able to offer necessary living conditions to people.

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

Free Belarus! Remove Lukashenko’s Wallet!


Remove Lukashenka’s wallet
The dictator will continue to ignore the West’s demands unless billions of dollars stop coming in.

The chair of the working group on investments at the Committee for International Control of the Human Rights Situation in Belarus Olga Zakharova said it in an interview to charter97.org. Olga has recently presented report The EU Dilemma: "What Kind of Dialogue with Belarus?" in Warsaw together with Yuri Dzhibladze.

- Olga, you became known as the chair of the Committee for International Control of the Human Rights Situation in Belarus first after the events of December 19, 2010 in Minsk. How did you become a human rights activist?

- My mother was born in Latvia, but she came to Russia to study, and stayed to live here. At first I was a biologist, or an environmental activist with a background in journalism. But eventually in the late 1990-early 2000s many of my colleagues from former soviet countries were put to prison. In Belarus, it happened to professor Yuri Bandazhevski; in Turkmenistan several people were pressed and had to leave the country. And here in Russia it became much harder to protect the environment, tress, people from the factories. The space squeezed and I realized that unless basic human rights are respected, there’ll be no environment. Belarus, Russia and Central Asia are gradually moving away from democracy, and I decided that I should work with human rights.

- When did you as a Russian human rights activist begin to work with the situation with human rights in Belarus?

- At first, it was the environment. Apart from Bandazhevski and all those “nuclear” cases, we worked with protection of the Bielavezhskaya pushcha. When the current powers got involved, we tried to preserve the national park, to save at least something. We held a successful international campaign that drew much attention, but eventually the ecologists had to leave. Then I was warned that it would be better for me not to return to Belarus.

But we did return on December 19, 2010. It was an international task to rescue the Belarusians that had to go to prison after the presidential elections. We should show solidarity. There is a law: if you don’t help others, nobody will help you. We realized that the same or a similar situation can happen in Russia. In fact, we were right…

- Thank you for your solidarity. How did your work look like at that time when so many people were in prison?

- At that time, a part of representatives of the Committee for International Control of the Human Rights Situation in Belarus were in Minsk working with youth at human rights seminars. Before the elections of December 19, 2010, we saw that someone had to watch and tell about the events to the international community. We kept in touch and started to act before the mass arrests. My colleagues and I had this idea to start the OSCE Moscow process, while the others who were in Minsk wanted to launch an observatory mission to tell about what was going on.

It became clear that still so many organizations alarmed by the situation in Belarus are looking for ways to help, there was a need to establish the committee, first of all, because the committee gives the possibility to coordinate actions. As a result, apart from the international observatory mission of the Committee for international control of the situation there was appointed Special Rapporteur on Belarus Neil Jarman whose report was very influential. It was the first appointment of a special rapporteur on Belarus since the events of December 19. His report was one of the factors that helped us start the OSCE Moscow process. We had to convince everyone that this was an extraordinary situation.

Even if the terror had never followed – the tortures in prisons, forced disappearances – this situation would still be classified as a “crisis”.

For a long time our mission was in fact the only international institution functioning in Minsk, because the OSCE mission was very soon asked to leave. It was basically the only source of information, and as soon as the Belarusian powers realized it they started to bar human rights activists from Russia and Ukraine from coming to the country. Our colleagues were stopped at the border; some were detained, some were deported or asked to leave Belarus within the nearest 24 hours and not to come back in the near future. This way, 20 persons were forced to leave Belarus, that not including the foreign journalists and activists of political movements. I am only talking about civil observers not related to political forces who only worked with human rights.

- You have mentioned a crisis. Is it over or is it still happening?

- In his report, the UN special rapporteur on Belarus Miklos Haraszti emphasized that we are dealing with a full-scale system crisis of human rights in Belarus. It reached its acute on December 19, 2010. A system crisis is not a fantasy. The European court of human rights has a definition for it. The situation in Belarus fits it perfectly.

Why is it important? We are looking at situations not only from the point of view of personal tragedies and broken lives, but we also consider the current events in Belarus and now in Russia. It is an attempt to rewrite the history of human rights, to give the powers right to do whatever they please. And if our rulers succeed, we will get a new frightening world. Syria will seem a paradise compared to what will happen here. It is already happening in several countries in Central Asia, but nobody is talking about it.

- How strong is the impact of the situation in Belarus on its neighbors – Russia and Ukraine?

- The impact on Russia is negative. For the last 20 years, a part of the nation has been living in an illusion that there is some kind of communist paradise across the border. Many people believe that there is this ideal model, “Byelorussia” as they call it. And it has a destructive effect not only on common people but on the intelligentsia, teachers, doctors who are not particularly interested in details and don’t have the full picture. Unfortunately, Lukashenka’s propaganda has proved very effective.

But the events after December 19, 2010, showed that the Belarusian powers can throw people to prison and torture them and not suffer any consequences. Sanctions? Conflict with the West? Well, there has always been a conflict. Then repressive laws followed. Belarus is a training ground. Lukashenko tries first, Big Brother repeats.

As for Ukraine, it will manage to keep balance unless the situation changes. The relations of Belarus with the European Union also play a role here. If the EU repeats the same mistake and says “it doesn’t matter that you have political prisoners and no democracy – just fix something a little bit,” Yanukovich and his team will realize that these methods can be used in Ukraine. And they will have it their way, the Eastern Partnership will just play along.

If the EU becomes more rigid (which is not so probable), there is a chance that the Ukrainian powers will act more properly. Obviously, neither Lukashenka, nor Yanukovich want to hug with Russia, and because both of them will lose their power at once.

I am going to say a very cynical thing. Everyone is anxious about the rising Russian military presence in Belarus. Why is Lukashenka doing it? He understands that nobody will perform a military overturn. This military base poses no threat to him. If the situation develops in the same direction, Putin will gain unlimited authority.

- Why are you so sure?

- There are norms of the international law. Russia will never choose a military overturn. The only thing Russia could complete was the little victorious war in Georgia. Hence, nobody will deprive Lukashenka of his power in a military overturn. If Russians get a full control over the Belarusian economy, there is no need in Lukashenko. Then he can be simply removed and placed in Drazdy.

As any paranoid, Lukashenko feels danger 100 steps away. Our forecast is that he will stay till the last drop in his games with Russia.

On the other hand, Lukashenko will try to “suppress” the European Union. And it would be really stupid to tell the Europeans (while export of Belarusian goods to Europe reduced by 40 percent during January-June 2013) to lift the sanctions against the dictator, which is already happening.

This person just like his entire team come from the Soviet Union. They don’t understand what a constructive dialog is. For them, it is a situation when the opposite part makes concessions and when the system of agreements, constraints and counterweights doesn’t function. Europeans can spend all time at a chess board, but Lukashenka will still beat them with a hockey-stick.

- What should Europe do? What are your recommendations?

- The system needs to change. Why don’t we support the international procedures that concern Belarus? Why did we need the OSCE Moscow mechanism so much? Why do we support the report of the UN special rapporteur Miklos Haraszti and why do we want his mandate prolonged? Because all these things put the situation in Belarus in a legal sphere.

You see, this ”dialog” with the EU about human rights, the ”dialog” with the USA is an invention of evil persons from the West who want to ”bend” the little poor country over. And when we appeal to the international legal norms, agreements and obligations that Belarus took on voluntarily, it proves that human rights are not an interior issue. If you want a dialog, you should fulfill your obligations, not act as little children at the dinner table: I’m not eating this, I’ll have that instead.

With these agreements, commonly accepted notions and norms, a road map of changes can be constructed to use for evaluation of the progress. If the political prisoners are released now (and in the current situation they will not be rehabilitated), there should be no illusions.

If there are no clear changes, there will be new political prisoners. Why is this situation so repulsive? Because the ruler says he acts in compliance with the law, that Belarus is a state of law. But if this law contradicts all international norms and agreements on human rights, it means that it is a bad law and it should be changed. There is no need for claiming hypocritically “we live in a state of law.”

- Do you support target sanctions against Lukashenko’s regime?

- It is not sanctions but restrictive measures, because sanctions are “carpet bombing”. We are talking about the need to limit the trade between the people who earn profits for Lukashenka’s regime and, first of all, the USA and EU.

A classic example: Latvia managed to lift these restrictive measures from some of the most profitable companies of Yury Chyzh. Basically, these companies worked via the profitable scheme of petroleum products trade estimated to generate 2-3 billion dollars.

Do you see now why Lukashenka ignores the demands of the international community? When the positive trade balance with the EU equals 8 billion, all threats sound ridiculous. It is much more than what they get from Russia.

That is why we believe that those who earn profits for the regime should face significant restrictions. The criteria are simple: we see who gets the best parts, and who gets license to trade with petroleum products, tobacco and alcohol.

- You have studied the situation with the Belarusian banks, too.

- This situation is interesting. We have questions about Iranian banks in Belarus, although formally sold because of the sanctions imposed by the USA. But the question of how and where the cash flows went remains, because we know that Belarus and Iran have a mutual agreement on direct accounting that doesn’t involve SWIFT. But you understand that these accounts are meant for direct deals of unknown character.
100 percent of shares of the North European Bank until recently called Onerbank belonged to Iranian banks. After the sanctions imposed by the West, the bank had to change its name and shareholders. Now, its owners are citizens of Germany and Turkmenistan. However, there are born Iranians among the board members.

There is Fransabank with Lebanese capital that operates in France, Lebanon and, I believe, Syria. For a couple of years ago, the New York court closed a case against this bank initiated on complaints of the victims of attacks against Israel, like Hezbollah attacks. The bank worked with accounts of this organization. There was enough evidence for the case, but it was still closed because the court lacked jurisdiction. Here comes a question: what does this bank do in Belarus, given the complicated history of Lukashenka’s weapon trade with all these friendly regimes in the Middle East? In my view, this situation should be scrutinized.

- Lukashenka’s prime income is from selling petroleum products to the West. There is a long-lasting argument: if this trade is limited, who will suffer – Lukashenka or the people?

- There are two aspects to this argument, a moral and a practical. The moral aspect: when the regime gets its key income from selling Russian petroleum products, the EU can follow the example of the USA and simply impose sanctions against Belneftekhim. But unfortunately, Europeans won’t dare do that. Moreover, they claim that the petroleum products mostly are transit goods. Then another question arises: where do these goods go to from Rotterdam? Maybe, the USA? This question should also be considered.

The practical aspect: restrictions of the petroleum products trade are needed at least for private companies, like it was with Chyzh’ companies which had a major impact on the regime But as we see today sanctions have been lifted from all these companies.

- Why is it happening?

- You surely understand that when some countries get the major part of their income from transit of goods, there comes a necessity, as they think, to ”compromise” and ”use a pragmatic approach”. And hence, if voters are discontent with the economic situation in the country, lobbyists’ job gets easier. Basically, charter97.org has published reports of security services of Latvia and Lithuania that said that the Belarusian special services are very active in these countries. We have an idea about what they do there. During a KGB meeting Lukashenka suddenly asked, what happens with this dialog with the West, which shows who is actually in charge of this “dialog”.